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eBeyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the
Individual in International Law. By Anne
Peters. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2016. Pp. xxxv, 602.
Index.
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.32
In Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of
the Individual in International Law, Anne
Peters, Director of the Max Planck Institute for
Comparative Public Law and International Law
and a professor at the universities of
Heidelberg, Free University of Berlin, and
Basel, undertakes an ambitious project regarding
the international legal status of the individual.
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Observing a “paradigm shift” in international law
(p. 1), in which “human beings are becoming the
primary international legal person” (back cover),
Peters sets out to describe, systematize and eval
uate “in a legally meaningful way” “the phenom
enon of the growth of individual rights and duties
under international law,” particularly over the
last thirty years (p. 7).
The survey project is an important and wel
come contribution to the literature. There is
indeed no other single source that systematically
looks at the scope, status, and development of
individual rights across the broad stretch of inter
national law. Few scholars, moreover, are better
qualified than Peters to undertake such a survey
given the extraordinary depth and breadth of her
intellectual engagement across fields of interna
tional law.
There is one field, however, that Peters insists
her study does not engage: the international law
of human rights. As human rights are already “the
central and entirely undisputed element of the
international legal status of the individual,”
Peters explains, “they are not an object of this
study” (p. 32).1 Rather, her project is to “bracket”
(p. 8) and look “beyond” human rights, a theme
elevated to central prominence by her title, to
show “how rich and differentiated” and “wide
spread and refined” what she collectively calls
“international individual right[s]” are outside of
the human rights field (id.). A clearer vision can
thereby be had of how entrenched and interwo
ven these rights have become in the twenty first
century, and hence how difficult it would be for
states to attempt to dismantle them (id.). It is
indeed a preoccupation with the legal possibility
that states could coordinate a complete disman
tlement of individual rights in international law
that drives Peters’s project.
Keeping human rights out of such a project
would serve an admirable purpose. In particular,
it would open the door to fresh analysis about
how individual rights are structured in distinct
fields of international law, what their
enforcement mechanisms look like, and who
can (and especially cannot) claim these rights
before distinct oversight and decisional bodies.
Such an analysis, unburdened by the often highly
distortionary tropes about individual rights that
pervade the human rights field, could then prof
itably have been used in a set of follow up pro
jects to provide greater insight and practical
perspective into current legal and political
debates in the human rights field, particularly
those centered on the relative enforcement capa
bilities of distinct sets of rights and rising intellec
tual critiques of alleged “rights inflation.”
Unfortunately, however, Peters does not keep
human rights out of her book. Nor is her analysis
shielded from the highly distortionary tropes
about human rights that pervade the field.
Rather, those tropes are embraced as the central,
if indirect, driver of the book’s entire analysis.
“Human rights” are thus raised pointedly and
directly in every chapter, with examined catego
ries of “international individual rights” interro
gated as to whether they could or should be
considered “human rights” or some “other” cate
gory of rights.2 And, yet, Peters never defines
what is meant by human rights, merely conclud
ing that investor, refugee, consular, labor, or
environmental rights are “different” and, in the
absence of “an additional category of rights,”
we would be compelled to qualify them as
“quasi human rights” (p. 318). Again and again
these statements are made, on the unexplained
and circular assumption that we must consider
1 The assertion that Peters’s book “does not deal
with human rights” (p. 318) and that human rights
“are not the subject of this book” (p. 530) is made
repeatedly throughout the chapters.
2 For examples, see p. 188 (“Are [individual rights to
remedy and reparation] human rights guarantees or
claims under ordinary law?”); p. 318 (“The interna
tional substantive rights of investors . . . are best not
understood as human rights in themselves maybe
with the exception of the right to property.”); p. 359
(“Are [consular rights] human rights?”); p. 442 (“it
appears mistaken to qualify these rights [to property
and due process] themselves as specific human rights”);
p. 446 (“procedural environment rights are not them
selves human rights”); p. 449 (“the right of option is
not itself a human right”); p. 454 (refugee rights “are
distinct from human rights”). The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) has concluded the classification
question itself is irrelevant to concrete questions put
before it. See, e.g., Case Concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ
Rep. 12, para. 124 (Mar. 31).
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an individual right a “human right” if we cannot
place it in another named category. The reason
for these odd and seemingly misplaced compari
sons did not become evident until the very end of
Peters’s six hundred page book.
And it is there, in the third part of Peters’s
book, that the most deeply concerning elements
of the book for human rights become apparent.
Peters, long a leading advocate of “global consti
tutionalism,” uses the concept as a structure to
undo and disassemble the entire international
human rights system as it exists today. Indeed,
reflecting a rising elite intellectual criticism of
“rights inflation” and the “rights of others,”3
Peters proposes a hierarchically tiered division
of international individual rights in which the
“ordinary” or “simple” rights she studies in the
first half of her book are joined by a set of less
worthy “human rights” that are “rezoned down
ward” from a superset. The remaining superset of
“human rights”would be immune from state dis
mantling or even modification, whereas the
“ordinary” rights (including rezoned human
rights) could be modified and dismantled at
will by states. The fact that this proposal is
advanced in a book that claims not to deal with
human rights is a jolt by any standard.
A grand irony thus pervades the book: while
presented as a scholarly and detached effort to
protect the individual’s legal status as a person in
international law, it in fact makes proposals that
threaten to undermine the entire foundational
system of protection for such legal personhood.
The fact that this is pursued through an argu
ment that advocates the complete dismantlement
of the comprehensive structure of post war
human rights, while simultaneously purporting
to “scientifically” and “stably” ground the inter
national legal personality of the individual in
international human rights law (albeit ignoring
what human rights law actually says about that
concept) makes the irony all the more intense.
None of the above is to diminish the substan
tial intellectual contribution or research quality
of Peters’s book. Rather, it is to call out the polit
ical implications of Peters’s specific proposals for
the future of international human rights law and
to place them more squarely within a larger intel
lectual debate in the human rights field about
how and by whom human rights are to be defined
and deployed. It is also important to consider
who benefits and who loses from such proposals.
The balance of this review will look at what may
be seen as the three distinct and severable parts of
Peters’s book project.
Peters’s six hundred page book is indeedmore
accurately three separate books. The first (chs. 4
12) does most directly and valuably what the
book jacket describes. It is a broad, richly
researched descriptive survey of the scope and
content of individual rights in nine broad sub
fields of international law “not relating to
human rights” (p. 7): international humanitarian
law, criminal law, investment law, consular law,
environmental law, protection of individuals
against acts of violence and natural disasters, ref
ugee law, and labor law. Outside Chapter 2, it is
where Peters is at her best. Indeed, showcasing
her tremendous and unique breadth of knowl
edge and detailed expert command over the sub
stance and scholarly debates in a broad range of
substantive international law fields, it is the
book that undoubtedly makes the greatest practi
cal contribution.
The primary weakness in this set of chapters is
that they were not more streamlined and focused
on empirical uses and use patterns across the sub
fields of international law, especially over the last
thirty years. The discussions often felt over pen
etrated with abstract legal status theory and
related forays into technical subquestions that
distracted from the descriptive purposes of the
survey as well as the ability to draw larger conclu
sions therefrom. There was indeed no chapter
dedicated to drawing together, comparing, and
systematizing lessons and patterns across fields.
The reader was also constantly puzzled at the
interrogation within chapters as to whether the
individual rights at issue could or should be con
sidered “human rights” or some “other” category
of rights. Both elements tended to take away
from the accessibility and clarity of the chapters,
and make the reader wish for a shorter volume
focused exclusively on the current empirical3 See sources in note 15, infra.
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status of individual rights across fields. Had
Peters limited her book to this primary end,
framed by her strong and persuasive Chapter 2,
it would have been an excellent and highly useful
stand alone contribution. It would also have
shortened the book by half, making it more
user friendly and accessible to both the scholar
and practitioner, as well as excerptable for the
classroom.
Peters, however, did not limit her book to this
end. She had two other central motivating objec
tives. The first was concerned with showing not
merely the “difficulty” of any coordinated effort
to dismantle the vast network of individual rights
recognized in international law today (the specific
object of book 1), but the “legal impossibility” of
doing so. The central motivating question of this
part (chs. 3, 13) was thus: is international
legal personality ultimately controllable by states?
To answer, Peters undertakes a civil law inspired
search in positive international law sources for
a “stable” and “scientific” grounding for the
concept that can be understood as “independent
of the state,” and hence irrevocable by state
action.
It is necessary to pause here to capture the
organizing frame within which Peters presents
her topic (ch. 1). The book’s central premise is
that there are two “rivalling Grundnorms”
(p. 3) in international law, each seeking to justify
the international legal order. The first, based in
the statist/dualist paradigms of legal positivism
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sees
international law as a purely “state centered sys
tem,” in which states are the exclusive legal sub
jects of the order and individuals have no
independent legal status or standing. Any rights
or position individuals might possess, through
treaty or custom, are bestowed at the pure and
sole discretion of states, and hence may be
revoked, even dismantled in their entirety, at any
time.
A second rival Grundnorm has long pushed
back against this state centric narrative. With
individuals, not states, at its center, it sees the
individual as the “true subject” and “natural per
son” of international law. Grounded in natural
law theories of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, as revived in the individualist interna
tional law legal theories of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, this Grundnorm has peaked
with twenty first century academic celebrations
of cosmopolitan globalization and assertions of
an unstoppable transformation from “interna
tional law” to “world law,” “global law,” a “new
jus gentium of humanity,” or “humanity’s law.”
Peters presents these Grundnorms as locked in
an epic battle for the soul and future of interna
tional law. From this vantage, Peters, a celebrant
of the latter Grundnorm, sees storms brewing on
the international horizon with geopolitical power
shifts and assertions of the “re sovereignization of
international law” (p. 555). She points to “the
rise of the BRICS States . . . and concomitant
decline of the United States and Europe” (p. 3),
heightened Chinese and Russian emphasis on
sovereign state prerogative, and growing backlash
against “overindividualization” in international
law (p. 6). These power shifts, she fears, threaten
the very legal status of the individual in interna
tional law. Her project is therefore an effort to
build a legally impenetrable fortification around
the status of the individual, thereby precluding
state intrusion into an untouchable and absolute
set of individual rights.
This framing will be difficult for some readers,
not least because it presupposes a view of law as
independent from and superior to politics and
power, a view not easily squared with everyday
realities. The excessive legal formalism of the
approach, especially in its search for impenetrable
absolutes, trumps, and categorical hierarchies
that can predetermine outcomes (rather than
requiring fact based balancing of competing
rights and interests, proportionality and reason
ableness assessments, and principles based justifi
cation of policy choices), is a weakness that will
make much of the analysis in the second and
third parts of the book feel artificial and circular
to some readers. This can be seen in a variety of
aspects.
For one, in the search for an absolutely pro
tectable core of meaning that is beyond the con
trol of states, Peters advocates a definition of
international legal personality of the individual
that is so thin and contentless (ch. 3) as to render
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superfluous the entire subsequent “search” for a
stable source for the concept in international
law (ch. 13). Indeed, Peters defines the concept
as nothing more than a “capacity” or “potential.”
It is, she explains, merely a “void,” fillable and
emptyable at will by states. Hence, she concedes,
it can be “entirely empty or without function if
no specific rights are granted” (p. 59). And, yet,
if states are without constraint in revoking/creat
ing new individual rights, why it matters if the
potential itself is revocable/recreatable is never
explained. Peters appears to recognize this,
repeatedly querying whether the concept is
merely “superfluous,” “useless,” “empty,” or a
“theoretical game,” and citing prominent authors
who have argued the same (pp. 40 41). Yet, she
offers no direct answer,4 simply leaving the con
cept alone for nine chapters, before seeking a
grounding for it in a recognized international
law source that can render it immune from
potential state attempts to dismantle it.
This sourcing exercise, however, raises its own
circularity concerns. Indeed, Peters begins her
book with a clear rejection of the notion that
“international legal personality” can legitimately
be grounded in natural law. This is so both
because that paradigm fails “today’s scientific
standards of intersubjective comprehensibility”
(p. 25) and because it has been “almost unani
mously rejected so far” (p. 34). A different,
more “stable” and “scientific” basis for the con
cept must therefore be identified in positive pub
lic law that is “independent of state control.” A
seemingly impossible charge is thus assigned to
Chapter 13. Peters had indeed already conceded
that “international law has no general codified
norm governing the definition and attribution
of international legal personality,” neither in “rel
evant treaties nor generally accepted principles of
customary international law” (p. 35). Her
Chapter 13 analysis of the three primary
authorized sources of international law treaties,
custom, and general principles (from ICJ Statute
Article 38.1) then went on to concede that
none met the requirement of independence
from state control.
Natural law suddenly no longer looked so
problematic. Peters thus circles back to it, landing
on human rights as a “kind of positivized natural
law” (p. 430). Reasoning that human rights
“often end[] up being tantamount to a trivial
form of natural law” and do “not stand on
much more solid ground” than natural law
(p. 429), she concludes by grounding the “origi
nal legal personality of the individual” in human
rights, and specifically in Article 6 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and Article 16 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(p. 430). She then uses a self described “teleolog
ical argument” (id.) to expand said norms from
their concededly intended application to legal
recognition of personhood in domestic law to a
“new” right to such recognition in international
law, which Peters now calls a “human rights
itself” (p. 431). The fact that this “dynamic”
and “evolutionary” process of new norm deriva
tion looks suspiciously similar to the “human
rights inflation” Peters condemns as “trivializing”
and “devaluing” human rights in the third part of
her book (thereby justifying her proposed
“downward rezoning” of such new rights to a
layer of entirely revocable norms) is difficult to
overlook.
Finally, the express grounding of the interna
tional legal personality concept in human rights
law raises an additional irony about Peters’s cho
sen definition of that new “human right.” Peters
indeed goes to pains in Chapter 3 to define
“international legal personality” as only a poten
tial or capacity to “have” or to “hold” rights, and
not a capacity to “exercise” or “enforce” them.
She thus embraces a complete “decoupling” the
sis between rights and their exercisability (p. 50),
explicitly rejecting the “principle of effectiveness”
as applicable to the concept at the international
level (pp. 48 49), and maintaining that the prac
tical ability to claim rights or be in a position to
4 She merely states that a failure to define the con
cept would make it impossible to “confer new rights on
an actor,” thereby trapping the status of the legal sub
ject “in the current state of positive law” (p. 41). Yet,
this appears to conflict with her own adopted defini
tion, which recognizes that states may create and
revoke rights at will (p. 59).
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actually exercise them is not a part of the right to
legal personality as she seeks to use it (pp. 44 45).
And, yet, human rights tribunals and treaty
law tell us the exact opposite. Indeed, regional
human rights tribunals and UN treaty bodies
have been explicit that the right to recognition
of legal personality encompasses not only the
abstract capacity to hold rights (which in itself
gives protection to no one), but to exercise and
enforce them, personally and directly, when threat
ened with deprivation or interference.5 Treaties
on the human rights of women and persons
with disabilities are textually explicit on this
point,6 given the legal doctrines of incompetence
and guardianship and other legal barriers that
have long been used to prevent individuals within
such groups from exercising and enforcing their
rights in practice. It is also why the right to an
effective legal remedy for alleged breaches of
rights is foundational to human rights law.7
By ignoring the substance of human rights law
in her chosen definition, Peters thus diverts
attention away from the very issues human
rights based legal capacity analysis requires us
to focus on: the practical and effective exercisabil
ity of individual rights by all people, without dis
tinction, once granted by positive law. This was
surprising, as her Chapter 2 discussion had
appeared to be a set up for targeting precisely
these practical enforcement issues in the surveys
of individual rights across subfields in Chapters
4 12.
Chapter 2, the most compelling and accessible
in the book, indeed takes the reader on a pleasur
able journey through the history of legal status
theory, from the natural law origins of the indi
vidual as subject of law in the sixteenth and sev
enteenth centuries, through the individual’s
displacement by the statism, legal positivism,
and dualist theories of the eighteenth and nine
teenth centuries, back through the re rise of indi
vidualistic theories in the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Most significantly, however,
it then pairs this theory survey with an overview
of actual legal practice from 1900 forward, query
ing whether “these ideas on the international
legal status of the individual [have in fact] been
reflected in legal practice” (p. 25), a question
the analysis answers in the negative.
Chapter 2 thus presents somewhat of a foil for
the rest of the book. It has two unmistakable
take aways. The first is that, regardless of the
changing tides of legal status theory, states have
consistently created and conferred individual
rights in international law when, where, and
how it served particular practical and political
5 See, e.g., UN Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1, Art. 12:
Equal Recognition as a Person Before the Law, paras.
11 14, UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1 (May 19, 2014)
[hereinafter CRPD] (defining legal capacity as the
“ability to hold rights and duties (legal standing) and
to exercise those rights and duties (legal agency),” and
insisting that the two strands “cannot be separated”
for the right to be fulfilled); Shtukaturov v. Russia,
App.No. 44009/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008) (deprivation
of legal capacity in judicial proceeding to directly and
personally represent own interests violated right to fair
trial and right to private life); Stanev v. Bulgaria, App.
No. 36760/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012) (individuals
placed under guardianship must be able to directly
and personally challenge their placement before
courts); Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment,
Inter Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C), No. 70, para. 179
(Nov. 25, 2000) (capacity to exercise).
6 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Art. 15(2), GA Res.
34/180, UNDoc. A/34/180 (entered into force Sept. 3,
1981) (“same opportunities to exercise that capacity”);
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Art. 12, UN Doc. A/RES/61/106 (entered into force
May 3, 2008) (guaranteeing safeguards with respect
to the “exercise” of legal capacity). See also CRPD,
General Comment No. 1, supra note 5, paras. 11 14.
7 LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1 5 (1990);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 8, GA
Res. 217A(III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948) (“Everyone
has the right to an effective remedy”); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2.3, GA
Res. 2200A (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
UNTS 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“any
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy.”); UN
Comm. Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts, General Comment
No. 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant,
UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (Dec. 3, 1998) (finding
States Parties required to provide effective legal reme
dies for all protected rights in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) under Article 2 of the Covenant); Report
of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and
Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, on
Access to Justice for People Living in Poverty, UN
Doc. A/67/278 (Aug. 9, 2012).
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needs of the moment. This explains why individ
ual rights are created so unevenly across fields and
political process actors, a fact evident in the dis
cussions in Chapters 4 12 but not explained as
such. It also explains large variations in the
kinds of enforcement mechanisms or institutions
that are created across fields and why so many
barriers to enforcement and exercisability are
erected despite formal rights creation.
The second take away went to precisely what
legal status theory is typically used for vis à vis
individual rights: to impose theory based doctri-
nal barriers to the direct and personal exercise
of certain individual rights, especially by less
powerful and privileged actors, once said rights
are formally created in law. Thus, just as Peters
recounts the usages of object theory in the nine
teenth century to disable the capacity of enslaved
persons to exercise their individually granted
rights to contest their captivity under the 1890
General Act of Brussels (pp. 13 14), so too do
theorists today use legal theories of “justiciability”
and, most recently, “inflation” to disable rights
holding individuals from legally claiming their
recognized rights before distinct enforcement
bodies. Peters’s repeatedly glowing citations to
Judge Antônio Cançado Trindade is striking in
this regard for those familiar with his legal opin
ions and scholarship. His Inter American Court
of Human Rights jurisprudence, for example, is
famous for rhetorically extolling the individual
legal subjectivity of all human rights in abstract
dicta, while basing the court’s ratio decidendi in
traditional doctrinal tropes that bar individuals
from directly and personally exercising their
autonomously guaranteed economic, social, and
cultural rights in regional treaty law.8
The long history of human rights is indeed not
primarily an effort to revoke broadly framed
rights (to life, liberty, dignity, security, due pro
cess) once granted. Rather, it is an effort by those
powerful and privileged enough to have had their
own particularized historical claims to such rights
successfully recognized to draw up the ladder,
seeking to prevent other less powerful claimant
groups from applying those same legal rights to
their own particularized group specific experi
ences of abuse, vulnerability, and injustice.9
This is especially true of “new” groups (women,
racial/ethnic/religious minorities, persons with
disabilities, LGBTQI communities) who seek to
make visible and address directly the particular
ized and group specific ways their own life, dig
nity, security, due process, and liberty rights are
unjustifiably and disproportionately harmed
within status quo relations and distributive policy
choices.
The theory based doctrines employed to draw
up the human rights ladder have varied across the
years. They have shifted from the powerfully
engineered biological explanations of innate
human difference and group separation of the
nineteenth century (i.e., to justify the continued
exclusion of women and racial/ethnic minorities
from the benefits of “universal” rights),10 to the
manipulated doctrines of “justiciability” in the
twentieth century (to preclude legalized
8Compare Juridical Status andHuman Rights of the
Child, Advisory Opinion OC 17/02 (Inter Am. Ct.
H.R. Aug. 28, 2001), Concurring Opinion Antônio
Cançado Trindade, para. 28 and “Five Pensioners”
Case v. Peru, Inter Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 98
(Feb. 28, 2003), Concurring Opinion Antônio
Cançado Trindade, para. 24 (“The individual is sub
ject jure suo of International Law, and to the recogni
tion of the rights which are inherent to him
corresponds ineluctably the procedural capacity to vin
dicate them, at national as well as international levels.”)
with “Five Pensioners” Case v. Peru (finding individual
claimants incapable of making direct and personal
claims of violation of their economic, social and cul
tural rights under Article 26 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, despite affirming
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over said norms).
For a critical discussion of the latter case, see Tara
J. Melish, Rethinking the “Less as More” Thesis:
Supranational Litigation of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in the Americas, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 171 (2006); Tara J. Melish, The Inter
American Court of Human Rights: Beyond
Progressivity, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE:
EMERGING TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 372 (Malcolm Langford ed.,
2008).
9 See, e.g., WIKTOR OSIATYŃSKI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THEIR LIMITS (2012).
10 See, e.g., LYNNHUNT, INVENTINGHUMAN RIGHTS:
A HISTORY 186 96 (2007) (describing nineteenth cen
tury biological explanations of exclusion)
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claimmaking to policy protections for economic,
social, and cultural rights by the socially margin
alized and economically excluded),11 to the new
doctrines of “inflation” in the twenty first cen
tury, which insist that the proliferation of
human rights claimmaking to address unjust
policy exclusions, disproportionate impacts, and
distributive policy choices is “dangerous” to
“core” human rights in their alleged “diluting”
and “trivializing” effect.
All, however, operate on the same basic logic
of zero sum competition between vying claimant
groups. The solution offered to such conflicts is
not context specific balancing and optimization
across rights, as human rights law intends,
but rather a search for hierarchical status and
categorical trumps that ensure winner take all
outcomes, usually to the most historically privi
leged. The losers in these games are inevitably
those with the least power, who are cut off
from human rights claiming on the argument
that their claims tomore inclusive, equitable, par
ticipatory, and justified policymaking are less
worthy or even “dangerous.”12
And it is here that red flags abound as Peters
promotes her particularized notion of “global
constitutionalism” in the third part of her book
(chs. 14 17). In contrast to regional versions of
“transformative constitutionalism”more popular
among scholars of the global South, which seek to
lift up and empower new voices and rights claims
as equal and valuable to democratic society,13
Peters’s version has a more exclusionary and hier
archical set of goals. Premised on the idea that
there are now “too many” competing individual
rights, it claims the proliferation of new claim
making is weakening the value of older claims.
To protect against the “devaluation,” “trivializa
tion,” and “overstraining” that allegedly comes
with such human rights “inflation” (pp. 443
45), these “new” rights, Peters argues, must be
“rezoned” downward into a category of “ordi
nary” rights “below the level of human rights”
(p. 444). This lower level of “ordinary” rights
(including downward “rezoned” human rights)
would then be summarily stripped of specialized
enforcement mechanisms, could never prevail
over conflicting super rights, and would be revo
cable andmodifiable at will by states. Their struc
turally inferior status and vulnerability to
complete override by claims to individualized
super rights would thus be globally “constitu
tionalized.” Peters is indeed explicit that the pur
pose of this hierarchical differentiation is to
“reduce the weight” of the “downward rezon
[ed]” rights in any balancing or proportionality
exercise (pp. 445 47).
By contrast, an elite set of “especially impor
tant” human rights would be structurally and
permanently protected as part of a hierarchically
superior layer of “international constitutional
law.” This elite set could never be modified or
revoked by treaty, would be subject to permanent
specialized international enforcement, and would
always prevail (regardless of the extent of harms
or how many people were adversely impacted)
over conflicting “ordinary” rights of others
(p. 447). A claim to such rights would thus
serve as a categorical trump over “less important”
rights, which would no longer have standing or
legal recognition. The very idea of human rights
“indivisibility” and “universality” would thus be
put on the proverbial chopping block.
Peters provides no definitive formula as to
how this “constitutional” division would be
accomplished, nor who would be competent to
do it. She is clear, however, that neither express
recognition in a human rights treaty or UN
declaration nor authorized interpretation by a
competent human rights tribunal or treaty body
is sufficient to “save” a human right from down
ward rezoning in her global scheme. Indeed,
11 See, e.g., Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart,
Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Should There Be an International Complaints
Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water,
Housing, and Health?, 98 AJIL 462 (2004); Melish,
Rethinking the “Less as More” Thesis, supra note 8.
12 See, e.g., Aryeh Neier, Social and Economic Rights:
A Critique, 13(2) HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (2006) (arguing
recognition of economic, social and cultural rights as
human rights is “dangerous” for civil and political
rights).
13 See TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW IUS
COMMUNE (Armin Von Bogdandy, Eduardo Ferrer
Mac Gregor, Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, Flavia
Piovesan & Ximena Soley eds., 2017).
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rights in the UDHR and ICESCR would explic
itly not make her cut. For Peters, these and other
rights “seem exaggerated” (p. 443), including the
rights to rest, sport, family planning, breastfeed
ing, sexual rights, indigenous peoples’ right to
their land, procedural rights, and labor protec
tions (pp. 444 45). Other frequently asserted
rights, she says, are “either nitty gritty or specifi
cations of broader basic rights” that “seem too
specific and/or not foundational enough to war
rant the human rights label in themselves”
(p. 444).
And, yet, what may appear “nitty gritty” or
“non foundational” for one group of interlocu
tors (because it has no lived experience with
such issues) may for another constitute the most
basic barriers to their lives, dignity, security, and
well being. A closer look at most alleged “fringe”
claims from breastfeeding, to sanitation, to
work place and education accommodations, to
indigenous access rights to land shows they
are neither novel nor trivial; they go to the very
core of the dignity and equality issues at stake.14
The fundamental question is “who decides?”And
what are the implications of denying entire
groups the ability to contest policies, practices,
and behaviors that cause them direct or dispro
portionate harm, yet which cannot be objectively
justified “in a democratic society” under any stan
dard of proportionality or reasonableness review?
Peters is not alone in her inflation criticisms.
She joins an increasingly vocal group of promi
nent academics and civil libertarians, mostly
from Europe and North America,15 who see
the primary danger to human rights in the
twenty first century as lying not in the fact that
too few people can claim their rights in demo
cratic society, but that too many can. Like
Peters, they argue that a set of “core rights”
must be separated from the rest, elevated to a
higher status, and protected from balancing
against “less important” ones. For most of these
scholars, however, “core rights” have a stricter
and more determinate meaning than Peters
allows: they are the eighteenth century catalogue
of classic civil and political liberties. Dominique
Clément thus defines “core rights” as limited to
freedom of religion, association, assembly,
press, speech, due process, and equal treatment.16
Michael Ignatieff, Aryeh Neier, and James
Griffin similarly define them as those basic civil
and political liberties necessary for (certain
kinds of) human agency,17 while Brian
Grodsky defines them as “‘integrity of person’
violations, including arbitrary arrest, disappear
ance, detention, torture and political killing.”18
These definitions unify in a revealing way:
each rejects any kind of rights claim that might
be conceived as addressing “social justice” or
questions of “redistribution.” This includes all
economic and social rights (other than individual
property rights) and rights that might conflict
with the dominance of majority determined
“culture.” These issues, such scholars contend,
are not genuine “human rights” and hence
must be confined exclusively to the realm of
14 As Pearl Eliadis notes, moreover, the difference is
often a simple question of framing. Thus, the sit ins
and protests at lunch counters in the 1960s could be
“trivially” reframed as fighting for “the right to have
lunch,” while the ejection of a black woman from a
downtown theatre could be recast as a struggle for
“the right to go to the movies.” Pearl Eliadis, Too
Many Rights?, in DOMINIQUE CLÉMENT, DEBATING
RIGHTS INFLATION IN CANADA: A SOCIOLOGY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 106 (2018).
15 See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 94 (2014); ARYEH NEIER, THE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2012);
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND
IDOLATRY (2001); DOMINIQUE CLÉMENT, DEBATING
RIGHTS INFLATION IN CANADA: A SOCIOLOGY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2018); Wiktor Osiatyński, Beyond
Rights, in ABUSE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS 309 27 (András Sajo ed., 2006); OSIATYŃSKI,
supra note 9, at 187 88; CONOR GEARTY, CAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SURVIVE? 144 (2006); András Sajo,
Illiberal Rights (unpublished paper on file with
author); Jacob Mchangama & Guglielmo Verdirame,
The Danger of Human Rights Proliferation, FOR. AFF.
(July 24, 2013); JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS
187, 192 93 (2008).
16 CLÉMENT, supra note 15, at 24 30.
17 IGNATIEFF, supra note 15, at 89 90; NEIER, supra
note 15, at 57 59; Neier, A Critique, supra note 12, at
2; GRIFFIN, supra note 15, at 187, 92 93.
18 Brian Grodsky, Weighing the Costs of
Accountability: The Role of Institutional Incentives in
Pursuing Transitional Justice, 7 J. HUM. RTS. 353,
361 (2008).
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW662 Vol. 113:3
662
politics, where “compromise” and “negotiation”
prevail.19 Of course, it is precisely in this domain,
unchecked by independent rights based review
and legal remedies, where less privileged claim
ants have never had the power to ensure their
rights were effectively addressed.
A second group of human rights scholars and
practitioners, especially those who work directly
with more vulnerable and marginalized commu
nities, thus roundly and emphatically reject
attempts by inflation scholars to redefine and
limit the human rights catalogue.20 For this
group, claims of rights inflation are not only fac
tually ungrounded and exaggerated (given how
difficult it is in practice for human rights claims
to be recognized), but serve the more sinister and
destructive end of disempowering and disabling
the very individuals human rights law depends
on for its relevance and effectiveness: those
directly impacted by societal injustice, yet with
out power to have their claims recognized within
status quo politics and public policies.
Indeed, the direct disabling of the rights claim
ing capacity of these individuals is, for many
human rights observers, simply another way to
usurp the larger reformatory agenda of human
rights law. It helps to transform that law from a
governance framework for democratizing state
society individual relations into one in which
selective claimant groups are empowered to use
their individualized “liberties” as trumps to block
rights based initiatives aimed at reforming public
policies, i.e., making them fairer and more equita
ble in their distributions of costs and benefits
across population subgroups.
The point of human rights law, in this view, is
not to “freeze” in time what constitutes unjusti
fiable or abusive conduct. Rather, it is to provide
individuals and communities (especially those
who have the least political power) with a set of
legal resources to be in a practical position to
challenge arbitrary, disproportionate, or other
wise unjustified interferences with their dignity
and well being, whenever and however they
occur.21 It is precisely through this iterative pro
cess of diverse claimmaking (geographically, tem
porally, and circumstantially), advanced through
the prism of affirmative state duty and justifiable
conduct, that human rights content is rendered
in the first place.
From this perspective, hierarchies and categor
ical trumps have little place in human rights law.
Rather, that law is about “balance,” “proportional
ity,” “optimization,” and “voice,” ensuring that
public authorities properly weigh the impacts of
distributional choices on the enjoyment of
human rights by “everyone” in public policymak
ing (with special attention to the most vulnerable).
Where arbitrary or disparate impacts are felt by
particular groups and those impacts cannot be jus
tified under rights based proportionality or reason
ableness review standards, those groups can
demand policy based relief and guarantees against
repetition as part of democratic society.
Such approaches, to be sure, pose direct chal
lenges to “old” ways of doing human rights. Yet,
those old ways, with their narrow priority on cer
tain classes of political claimants, absolutist con
structions, and demands of state abstention and
restraint, are increasingly seen as handmaidens of
rising inequality and social marginalization. For
growing numbers across the globe, human rights
have correspondingly become not a language of
liberation, equality, empowerment, and inclusion,
but of exclusion, elitism, and lack of institutional
concern for the needs of the people. Authoritarian
demagogues, of both right and left wing variants,
pick up on this, amplify it, and use it to bludgeon
human rights still further.22
19 See, e.g., Neier, A Critique, supra note 12, at 2;
CLÉMENT, supra note 15, at 49 50.
20 SeeNathalie Des Rosiers, The Right Investment in
Rights, in DEBATING RIGHTS INFLATION, supra note 15,
at 79; Eliadis, Too Many Rights?, supra note 14, at 97;
PEARL ELIADIS, SPEAKING OUT ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
DEBATING CANADA’S HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM (2014);
Melish, Rethinking the “Less as More” Thesis, supra
note 8 (rejecting the claim that limiting rights to a nar
row set of civil and political liberties can enhance
human rights protections for most communities).
21 See, e.g., Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible
Participation of the Poor: New Governance, New
Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources
of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 72
110 (2010).
22 See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, Populism and Human
Rights in Sub Saharan Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
TIME OF POPULISM: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES
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Within this context, globalist projects like the
one advocated by Peters carry little hope of
strengthening human rights. Rather, by remov
ing the capacity of the most marginal and vulner
able to challenge their policy based exclusions
from society, they threaten to deepen already
deep global divides, further undermining the
very promise that post war human rights indivis
ibility, universality, social duty, rights balancing,
and proportionality and reasonableness review
held out for strengthening inclusive democratic
governance and hence preventing the global
catastrophes that led to the post war human
rights catalogue in the first place.
In short, there is nothing beyond human rights in
Peters’s book. To the contrary, the book joins a
growing chorus of internationalist literature that
misdiagnoses national level push back pressures
to absolutized notions and selective enforcement
of individual rights. Claiming the need to “save”
human rights from inflation, this growing literature
insists not that human rights must be made more
accessible to and effective for those without historic
access to them, but rather more limited, elitist, and
absolutist. Unless a different narrative of the inter
play between individual rights and state sovereignty
is told in international law, one which sees them
not as existential Grundnorm rivals in a potential
zero sum game, but as necessary partners in the
consolidation of localized rights based participa
tory democratic governance, we will indeed have
moved “beyond” human rights.
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